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  11 Introduction 
The analysis of citizenship has had a long tradition within the moral and political theory. The 
socio-political importance of citizenship in the civic society was emphasized amongst others 
by John Locke (1690) who distinguishes between active and passive membership in a society. 
He argues that only the access by explicit commitment and contract makes an individual a full 
member of a nation state. This position has by now been embraced by almost all legal systems 
of modern states, which differentiate their inhabitants in natives and foreigners. While the 
process of acquiring citizenship differs by country, in all states citizenship status is connected 
with a number of legal rights. An example is the entitlement to vote which is in modern 
societies typically associated to citizenship. For this reason naturalization, which is defined as 
the acquisition of citizenship by a foreigner, can affect the socio-economic integration of 
immigrants in a country in various ways.  
Whereas social scientists spent significant efforts to analyze the political and sociological 
implications of naturalizations, economists neglected this topic a long time.
1 One of the first 
economic studies that deals with the topic of citizenship is due to Chiswick (1978), who has 
analyzed the economic assimilation of immigrants. Using cross-sectional data from the U.S. 
census for the year 1970, Chiswick examines the assimilation process of immigrants by 
comparing the earnings of native and foreign-born men. Overall, Chiswick finds a positive 
effect of naturalization on earnings that becomes insignificant when he controls for years of 
residence. In the following years the economic literature on immigrant assimilation mainly 
focused on skill and language acquisition. Recently, economists have renewed their interest in 
the topic of naturalizations. However, most of them looked at this issue in the U.S. or Canada 
(see Bratsberg et al. (2002), DeVoretz and Pivenenko (2005a), DeVoretz and Pivenenko 
(2005b), DeVoretz (2008), Mazzolari (2007)). For European countries exist only few 
empirical studies that analyze the economic impact of naturalizations like Kogan (2003) for 
Austria and Sweden, Bevelander and Veenman (2006) for the Netherlands and Scott (2006) 
for Sweden. 
A drawback of most existing studies is that they are based on cross-sectional data, which does 
not allow to control for self-selection concerning unobservable characteristics within the 
group of immigrants. The study of Bratsberg et al. (2002) is the first to use cross-sectional as 
well as longitudinal data to estimate the effect of naturalization on wage growth of foreign-
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive overview of sociological studies about naturalizations see Yang (1994). 
  2born men. The authors show that naturalization has a significant positive effect on the 
earnings of immigrants even after controlling for differences in unobserved individual 
characteristics. Bratsberg et al. (2002) show that wage growth accelerates after the acquisition 
of citizenship, indicating the existence of barriers to entry in certain jobs for immigrants 
without U.S. citizenship. In his longitudinal analysis for Sweden, Scott (2006) finds as well a 
positive effect of naturalization on wages of immigrants. In contrast to the findings of 
Bratsberg et al. (2002), he concludes that the true naturalization premium of immigrants is 
largely caused by selection on part of the individual and not by legal implications. For the 
case of Germany, there is up to the present no empirical evidence on whether the acquisition 
of citizenship has any effects on the labor market outcomes for immigrants. Furthermore, it 
remains unclear what is the role played by unobserved characteristics to explain the 
naturalized immigrants` wage premium. The purpose of this to paper is to address this 
question by estimating the impact of naturalization on wage growth of immigrants in 
Germany. The data used are actual official micro data and come from the employment sample 
of the institute for employment research (IAB). The econometric analysis is carried out using 
both cross-sectional and panel data techniques, which allow to disentangle the effects of self-
selection and legal impact of citizenship acquisition. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents stylized facts on 
naturalization in Germany by outlining the legal framework and the quantitative dimension of 
the phenomenon. Section 3 contains some theoretical considerations about the relationship 
between legal status and labor market performance. The data is presented in section 4. In 
section 5 descriptive statistics are presented. Section 6 contains the results of pooled and 
longitudinal estimations while chapter 7 concludes the paper, discussing the policy 
implications of the analysis. 
 
2 Naturalizations in Germany 
2.1 Citizenship law 
Until the beginning of the 1990s, the German citizenship law was characterized by the 
principle of the Jus Sanguinis, i.e. the principle of descent. According to this, citizenship is 
recognized to any individual who is born to a parent who is a national or citizen of Germany. 
Foreigners had no entitlement to naturalize derived from law. Birth and prolonged residence 
in Germany did not establish any right to access German citizenship. The only possibility to 
  3acquire citizenship for foreigners was to marry a German person or to get an extraordinary 
entitlement by the relevant official authority (see Brubaker 1992, pp. 77-84). 
 
After initial changes in the alien legislation in 1990, the legal situation in Germany changed 
substantially in 1999 when a fundamental reform of the citizenship law was conducted. The 
reform adds the Principle of Jus Soli to the existing law. Thanks to this reform, children of 
immigrants who are born in Germany attain by birth the German passport. A special provision 
allows them to retain the citizenship of their parents till the age of 23. Not later than this age 
they have to decide between one of the two citizenships. This solution has been called the 
“option model”. Furthermore, the new law entitles every immigrant to naturalize if she/he 
fulfils a number of requirements. These requirements are: residence of at least 8 years in 
Germany, possession of an appropriate residence permit, sufficient knowledge of the German 
language, the ability to support themselves without recourse to social assistance or 
unemployment benefits, allegiance to German constitution and no serious criminal offences. 
Finally, they must also give up their previous citizenship.
2 During the last years this has been 
the most frequently used channel by which immigrants naturalized in Germany (see 
Steinhardt 2007, pp. 544-545). Recently Germany has implemented a standardized 
naturalization test which is obligatory since September 2008 for all immigrants who want to 
naturalize. The multiple choice test includes various questions on German history, geography, 
politics and society. 
2.2 Quantitative dimension 
Figure 1 shows the number of annual naturalizations in Germany during the time period from 
1981 to 2007. As it is clear from the figure naturalizations played a minor role during the 
1980s, with less than 50,000 naturalizations per year. With the beginning of the 1990s, the 
picture changes and the number of naturalizations increased continuously with a peak in 1995 
when 313,000 people acquired the German citizenship. However, the overall figures include 
ethnic Germans, the so-called Spätaussiedler. These are immigrants of German origin from 
the former Soviet Union (see Steinhardt 2007, pp. 545-546). This group is not of interest for 
our analysis, because they receive in general automatically the German citizenship without 
any precondition when they enter the country. For this reason, the diagram shows separately 
                                                 
2 For this requirement exists a set of exceptions. 
  4the number of foreigners that naturalized.
3 With the coming into effect of the new citizenship 
law on the 1
st of January 2000 the number of naturalized foreigners increased strongly. 
Although the number of naturalizations declined in the subsequent years almost continuously 
it is remarkable that between 2000 and 2006 on average 143.000 foreigners per year decided 
to become German citizens, compared to 92.000 per year during the period 1994 and 1999. 
Overall almost 1,700,000 foreigners naturalized during the period 1994 and 2007.  




































To interpret these figures it is useful to incorporate the size of the foreign population within 
the country. This is done calculating the naturalization rate which is annually defined as the 
number of naturalizations in relation to the number of foreigners within the country. It now 
becomes obvious that the share of immigrants in Germany who naturalize is relative low 
compared to other European countries. While in 2006 the naturalization rate in Germany was 
1.7% countries like France (4.2%), the Netherlands (4.2%), Great Britain (4.5%), Austria 
(3.2%) and Sweden (10.7%) exhibit significant higher naturalization rates.
4 This might be due 
to national differences in legal frameworks, the socio-economic structure of the immigrant 
populations and eventually the public opinion towards naturalization.
5  
                                                 
3 The numbers of naturalized foreigners have been constructed by the author. Due to time inconsistencies related 
to immigration and naturalization of ethnic Germans, the depicted figures can contain some inaccuracies. The 
figures before 1994 were not reconstructable due to legal reasons.  
4 Figures derived from own calculations with data from Eurostat. 
5 The topic of naturalization in German debates has been frequently connected to fears and concerns which might 
lower the incentive for foreigners to naturalize. A prominent example is the debate on naturalization tests in 
  5Since the 1990ties the leading country of origin among naturalized foreigners in Germany has 
been Turkey. That is consistent with the fact that Turks are by far the largest group within the 
foreign population in Germany. In 2000, 44.4% of all naturalized immigrants were of Turkish 
origin. Second largest group within naturalized immigrants are people of Asian origin 
(26.5%). The leading countries within this group are Iran, Afghanistan and Lebanon. Third 
major group are Ex-Yugoslavs who accounted for 9.7% of the naturalized immigrants in 
2000. In contrast to this, the share of naturalized immigrants from an EU country is with 4.3% 
comparatively low (see Steinhardt 2007, pp.546-548).
6 The aggregate figures therefore 
demonstrate that the topic of naturalization in Germany is mainly related to immigrants from 
outside the European Union. 
 
3 Legal status and labor market performance 
In the following, some theoretical arguments are discussed to explain why the naturalization 
could change the economic well-being of an immigrant. Since in many cases the effect 
depends strongly on the legal requirements and consequences of naturalization within a 
country, the following discussion refers explicitly to the situation in Germany. In general, 
three groups of immigrants working and living in Germany can be distinguished: citizens of 
the European Union, nationals of associated states like Turkey, and Third Country Nationals 
(see Hailbronner 2007, pp. 3-4). The fact that the legal status and labor market access differ 
strongly among these groups has to be taken into account in the empirical analysis.  
The first obvious channel by which naturalization can affect productivity is unrestricted 
access to the labor market (see Yang 1994, pp. 452-453; Bratsberg 2002, pp. 569-570). Due to 
legal reasons access to a number of jobs in the public sector requires the possession of the 
German passport. For example, activities in the justice, national defense and in administrative 
departments are general reserved to German citizens.
7 To some extent this also holds for 
certain jobs within the independent personal services like dentists, doctors, pharmacists, 
lawyers and architects. However, these restrictions do not apply to European citizens.
8 
                                                                                                                                                         
early 2008 which focused on the question: “How can we avoid that immigrants with unfavorable characteristics 
will become German citizens?” 
6 This relationship holds also true for the period 2000 to 2007. However, the share of naturalized Turks has been 
continuously decreasing while the share of naturalized immigrants from the EU has increased slightly due to the 
EU enlargement in 2004. 
7 This regulation applies as well to EU citizens. The general possibility for EU citizens to become civil servants 
can be restricted for strict sovereign activities (see §39 section 4 Treaty establishing the European Community 
(TEC)).  
8 I would like to thank Marcel Kau from the University of Konstanz, who helped to clarify the actual legal 
situation in Germany. 
  6Furthermore, a number of jobs require unrestricted mobility of employees without 
bureaucratic hurdles. This is especially related to jobs in the transport sector or cross-border 
services that are associated with a high frequency of travel. For this reason, the possession of 
the German passport is not a legal engagement criterion, but a functional precondition. 
Therefore, the naturalization reduces institutional and functional labor market barriers and 
enables free job choice of immigrants.  
In addition to this, naturalization can lead to a reduction of costs from the perspective of the 
employer. In the case of foreign employees with a temporary work or residence permit this 
happens in two ways. First, naturalization results in a decline in the administrative costs of the 
employer. This is caused by the fact that the administrative effort of the employer for foreign 
workers is in this case significantly higher than for workers with a German passport. For 
instance an employer who wants to engage a foreigner from outside Europe has always to 
conduct a so-called priority test, which ensures that no national or European worker is 
available to do the job (see Hailbronner 2007, pp. 17-18).
9 This issue has already been raised 
by the German Federal Government in its annual report in 2000, when it pointed out that 
employers abstain from employing foreigners due to legal and bureaucratic hurdles. Second, 
naturalization reduces the transaction costs of the employer (see Cahuc and Zylberberg 2004). 
From the perspective of the employer a German passport alleviates the insecurity about the 
individual and occupational future of the employees, since it guarantees that the employed 
immigrant has the right to live and work permanently in Germany. Both these arguments 
imply that an employer, who has the choice between two job applicants with equal 
qualifications and skills, prefers the one with the German passport. 
In the literature about the effect of naturalization impacts the first component of this cost 
reduction argument has already been addressed (see Bratsberg et al. 2002, p. 569; Mazzolari 
2007, p. 20). In general, it is associated with the phenomenon of discrimination. However, 
following Becker’s (1973 pp. 13-17) definition, this behavior of the employer cannot be 
judged as discriminatory. The higher administration costs of foreign employees are an 
objective reason to prefer employees with a German passport. Despite this it has to be 
assumed that some employers have a taste for discrimination that sums up to the market wage 
rate (see Becker pp. 39-40). However, in contrast to the U.S. by law legally employed 
foreigners are in Germany treated equally to natives in the job. This is true for aspects of 
                                                 
9 The test guarantees the so-called primacy of natives (“Inländerprimat”), which is part of the foreigner 
legislation in Germany since 1965. 
  7employment provisions as well as for trade union agreements (see Hailbronner 2007, p. 20). 
To sum up, naturalization can increase the labor market opportunities of an employee with 
migration background in several ways. Due the existing provisions on the free mobility of 
workers within the EU the distinction is to a lesser extent about having a German or a foreign 
nationality, but about being a member of a European Union country or a Third Country 
National. 
Furthermore, naturalization provides job relevant information to the employer. With the 
decision to naturalize, the individual expresses his wish to live permanently in Germany, 
demonstrates sufficient language skills, proved that he has already lived for a number of years 
within the country, commits to the German constitution and has been able to support himself 
without needing social assistance or unemployment benefits prior to naturalization. This 
information is in general positively reviewed by the employer since it documents a certain 
degree of identification and integration. Because an employer cannot observe the productivity 
of an employee every transaction on the labor market is connected with an extent of 
uncertainty from the perspective of the employer prior to hiring. For this reason an employer 
uses the observables characteristics of a job applicant to estimate the conditional probability 
of competence (see Spence 1974, pp. 5-9). These characteristics can be all information about 
the individual to which the employer has access prior to hiring. In general, these are 
education, employment history and personal characteristics. While some of these 
characteristics, e.g. education, are partially or completely controllable by the individual, 
others are not (e.g. sex). From the perspective of the employee, it is reasonable to make those 
adjustments that will improve his or her position in the job lottery (see Spence 1974, pp. 9-
14). The citizenship status is a personal characteristic which can be altered by an individual, 
and which conveys significant information potential if it is not determined by birth. The 
naturalization act therefore can be interpreted as a signaling device, which can be used by 
employers for selection purposes.  
An aspect by which the productivity can increase directly is connected to the location decision 
of naturalized employees. In almost all cases, immigrants who naturalize have already 
decided in advance that they stay in Germany over a longer period or for lifetime. In general, 
this long-term location decision encourages immigrants to foster their investment in 
education, language and country specific skills (Mincer and Polachek 1974). The 
accumulation of human capital should have a positive impact on the labor market 
performance and should lead to assimilation in earnings to natives. The following empirical 
  8analysis will try to address these different impact channels by integrating the time dimension 
explicitly in the analysis. If naturalization has a positive impact on labor market opportunities, 
naturalized employees should exhibit some change in their performance in the labor market 
after the naturalization. If on the other hand the investment in country-specific human capital 
affects the productivity positively naturalized employees should feature also stronger wage 
growth before the acquisition of German citizenship. 
4 Data 
The data is from the current version of the employment sample of the IAB, which is a 2 
percent random sample of all employees covered by social security during the period 1975 to 
2001. According to this restriction the sample comprehends no self-employed, family workers 
and civil servants. Overall the dataset covers more than 80% of the whole labor force in 
Germany. The sample contains various sociodemographic characteristics at the individual 
level like daily wage, education and age (see Bender and Haas 2002). The legal basis of the 
dataset is the integrated reporting procedure regarding pension, unemployment and health 
insurance.
10 Therefore, the data are highly reliable in comparison to survey data. However, 
the reliability differs between particular variables.  
Generally, it can be distinguished between characteristics that are collected due to insurance 
purposes (e.g. wage, employment duration), and information that has only a statistical use 
(e.g. education). Characteristics of the first category are related to payments to the social 
security system. This entails that employer and employee are interested in an accurate 
description.
11 Furthermore, the declaration of the employee is checked by the social insurance 
companies, the pension fund and the employment agencies through various plausibility 
tests.
12 In contrast to this, the reliability of the statistical characteristics that are related to the 
employee relies nearly completely on the accurateness of the employer.
13 The imprecise data 
entry is enforced by the fact that the reporting person changes with every new job of an 
individual. In general, two types of error are possible: wrong information is recorded or 
                                                 
10 The reporting procedure demands from every employer that he notifies all employees that are subject to social 
security contributions within a certain time limit to the social insurance carriers. The data collection is a 
multistage process beginning with the employer reporting the information to the insurance companies. 
Afterwards the data is submitted to the pension funds, which in turn send selected variables to the employment 
agency. These data is then used to construct the employment sample (see Bender et al. 1996, pp. 4-5, Federal 
Statistical Office Germany 2006, p. 6). 
11 The employee gets a copy of the report that is sent by the employer to the social insurance companies. 
12 Since 2001 a common programme called “Kernprüfprogramm” is used by the social insurance carriers to 
check the accurateness of the reported information. 
13 Statistical characteristics of the company are collected by specialists of the employment agencies. 
  9wrong information is transferred (see Cramer 1985 pp. 62-65, Koch and Meineken 2003 pp. 
160-162, Drews 2006 pp. 4-6). This leads to a substantial degree of inconsistency in the data 
concerning all individual characteristics that are not related to payments. 
A consequence of this misrepresentation is that a number of employees in the database have 
more than one change of citizenship during the whole observation period.
14 For this reason, 
various procedures had to be implemented to erase implausible information concerning the 
nationality of employees. As a first step, the original specification of the nationality variable 
from the weakly anonymous version of the employment sample was imported. This reduced 
the number of missing values significantly, since the anonymous version contains detailed 
information about the nationality of employees from the New Laender as well. Secondly, an 
algorithm was developed and implemented to replace missings and inconsistent data 
concerning the nationality within one period.
15 Thirdly, inconsistent nationality information 
that was embedded between two periods was replaced.
16 The result of the implementation of 
these methods was a reduction of employees with multiple citizenship change.
17 However, the 
share of this group remains still quite high. Despite of this no additional data preparation was 
conducted, since every data adjustment raises the risk of introducing new errors. Furthermore 
multiple citizenship change in the dataset is as well caused by employees with double 
citizenship, because their reported nationality presumably differs case by case.  
Following the data cleaning various procedures were implemented which allow us to identify 
the time, number and direction of citizenship change. These were then used to remove all 
natives from the data set. A native employee is herby defined as an individual who possess a 
German passport throughout the whole observation period. In addition to this, employees who 
exhibit multiple citizenship change have been removed from the data set. By this individuals 
with ambiguous citizenship status or double citizenship are excluded from the analysis. The 
same holds true for employees who change from a foreign nationality to another alien 
citizenship at a certain point of time or who expatriate.
18 Subsequently the dataset contains 
only records of employees who have a foreign nationality throughout the whole observation 
                                                 
14 For example: during the observation period changes the nationality of an employee from German to Turkish 
and back again.  
15 This is related to cases where an employee has different nationalities within one reporting period in parallel 
spells, e.g. Turkish in the main job, and German in the side job. The criterion used for the replacement of 
inconsistent data was the main job. 
16 For example: If an employee had the German nationality in 1999 and 2001, but the Turkish nationality in 
2000, the information was changed in 2000 to German. 
17 At this point I like to thank Nils Drews from the IAB, who provided me with some useful algorithms. 
18 The latter is related to people with original German nationality who acquired a foreign nationality at some 
point of time. 
  10period and of foreign employees who naturalize at a certain point of time.
19 After this, cross-
sections were drawn for every year. This was done by using the annual notification of an 
employee at the end of every year whereas only the information of the main job was 
recognized.
20 Afterwards the dataset contains for every employee at most one notification per 
year. The final structure of the dataset is an unbalanced panel.  
Work experience was approximated by subtracting the average age of labor market entrance 
from the actual age of an employee by education categories using data from the IAB 
education report (see Reinberg and Hummel 1999). Due to anonymization purposes the 
dataset gives no information about the age of employees who are at a certain point of time 
older than 62 or younger than 15.
21 For this reason, an algorithm was developed and 
implemented to approximate the age of these employees. For people marked younger than 15 
the date of birth was identified by subtracting 15 years from the first year of coverage, while 
the date of birth of employees marked elder than 62 was calculated by subtracting 65 years 
from the last year of coverage. The presumption underlying this procedure is that nobody 
younger than 14 or older than 65 years is covered by the sample. Especially the latter 
supposition does not seem to be very realistic, but this pragmatic approximation allows us to 
include the lower and upper age groups. Since the employment sample does not contain any 
information about hours worked only fully employed people were considered in the data set. 
Eventually, the sample was restricted to men, because of the significant differences between 
men and women concerning the employment history.  
Overall, the dataset includes about 500.000 observations during the period 1975 to 2001 
which correspond to more than 60,000 individuals. About 11% of all employees have 
acquired citizenship at a certain point of time (see appendix 1). On average, each employee is 
observed 15 times during the whole observation period. While the minimum lies at 1 
observation, the maximum observation period is 27 years. Concerning differences between 
non-naturalized and naturalized immigrants the last group exhibits a higher average 
observation period which is beneficial for disentangling wage growth pre and post 
naturalization. 
                                                 
19 The final data set contains no ethnic Germans, the so-called Spätaussiedler. 
20 The advantage of using the annual notification is that every employee who works over two years is captured. 
21 These people are marked throughout the whole data set with the category older than 62 or younger than 15. 
  115 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 shows the education background of all employees covered in the final data set for the 
whole observation period. The figures clearly indicate that employees who naturalize possess 
a higher qualification profile than employees who keep their foreign nationality. However, the 
figures do not differentiate between time before and after naturalization. Therefore, the 
figures mean that during 1975 and 2001 on average 50.86% of the foreign employees 
recorded no apprenticeship, while only 33.47% of employees who decided to naturalize at a 
certain point of time have no professional education. The difference in qualification becomes 
apparent in the highest educational category: the share of individuals with a university degree 
is within the group of employees who naturalize more than two times higher than within the 
group of foreign employees. These results are consistent with other evaluations for Germany 
on the basis of different data sources like the Microcensus (see Steinhardt 2007, p. 548). 
 
Table 1: Sociodemographic characteristics  
  Foreign employees  Employees who naturalize 
Education (share in %) 
Without apprenticeship  50.86  33.47 
Secondary school with apprenticeship  26.84  41.96 
Abitur without apprenticeship  0.61  0.94 
Abitur with apprenticeship  0.74  1.77 
Technical college degree  0.91  2.36 
University degree  2.50  5.43 
Missings 17.53  14.06 
Occupational Status (share in %) 
Apprenticeship 3.17  5.17 
Unskilled worker  59.46  40.03 
Skilled worker  25.79  28.64 
Foreman 0.42  1.14 
White collar employee  9.42  22.09 
Home work  0.02  0.03 
Part-time work  1.69  2.06 
Missings 0.02  0.02 
Source: own calculations with data of the IAB employment sample 1975-2001 
The big discrepancy in the formal qualification of the two groups corresponds to differences 
in the occupational status (see lower part of table 1). Only 9.4% of the foreigners are white 
collar employees, whereas 22% of the immigrants who naturalize belong to this category. The 
vast majority of the foreign employees are unskilled workers. Surprisingly, within both 
groups the fraction of foreman is very small, while the share of skilled workers is nearly the 
  12same (26-29%). The disparity between both groups, therefore, relates mostly on the lowest 
and highest occupational categories.  
Table 2 shows that the average age of a foreign employee is 39 when he acquires the status of 
German citizen. Compared to the results of other studies this age is relatively high. This can 
be explained by the fact that the dataset is restricted to the male workforce liable to social 
insurance. Other data sources like the naturalization statistics of the Federal Statistical Office 
contain all groups of the population. Especially the inclusion of children and young 
individuals who are still in the educational system leads to a lower average age of the 
naturalized migrants in these data sets.  
Table 2: Average age at naturalization 
 Average  age  Min  Max 
Age at naturalization  38.98 (10.51)  16  65 
Standard deviation in parentheses 
Source: own calculations with data of the IAB employment sample 1975-2001 
 
It may be expected that the displayed difference in formal qualification and occupational 
status between foreigners and immigrants who naturalize is reflected in wages. For this reason 
table 3 shows the average annual wages for both groups. It becomes obvious that on average 
employees who naturalize earn higher wages than foreign employees. With almost 4 Euros 
the wage premium is quite substantial. This corresponds to large sociodemographic 
differences between the two groups. For the sake of comparison, the table also presents the 
average wage of German employees.
22 As expected, the average wage of native Germans is 
higher than that of foreigners and as well as that of immigrants who naturalize. The 
interesting question is henceforward, whether the naturalization act itself has an impact on the 
economic performance of immigrants. Therefore, the lower part of table 3 exhibits as well the 
average wages of employees who naturalize before and after becoming German citizens.  
 
The figures show that on average employees who naturalize earn higher wages already before 
the naturalization act, as compared to foreigners who do not naturalize at all. However, at the 
point the wage premium is relative small. In contrast to this, the average wage after 
citizenship acquisition is considerable higher than before the naturalization and than the 
                                                 
22 For this purpose all elementary data preparation steps were conducted without erasing the German employees 
from the sample. 
  13average wage of foreigners - it even reaches the level of native German employees. This 
could be a first indicator that citizenship plays a substantial role in the German labor market. 
Table 3: Average daily wages  
  Average daily wage (in Euro) 
Foreign employees  67.38 (22.79) 
Employees who naturalize  71.03 (27.67) 
German employees  77.72 (25.56) 
Before naturalization  68.24 (26.62) 
After naturalization  77.20 (28.96) 
Standard deviation in parentheses 
Wages were deflated by using the consumer price index of the former federal territory on the basis 1995. 
Source: own calculations with data of the IAB employment sample 1975-2001 
 
To which extent can the huge wage gap between naturalized and foreign employees be 
explained by different educational attainment? A first answer can be provided by a Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition, which is a popular tool to decompose a wage differential between two 
groups into differences in endowment and estimated coefficients (see Oaxaca (1973), Blinder 
(1973)). This method has been already used by DeVoretz and Pivenenko (2005b, p.454-461) 
to explain the wage differences between natives and naturalized immigrants in Canada. We 
will use an extended version that also includes an interaction term (see Daymont and 
Andrisani 1984). This is done by: 
(1) 
) β )(β X X (
) β (β X )β X X ( β X β X ) W ln( ) W ln( ) W Δln(
F N F N
F N F F F N F F N N F N
− − +
− + − = − = − =
 
As the benchmark we take the average (in logarithms) daily wage of naturalized employees. 
The first component of the decomposition represents the differences due to characteristics, 
while the second term captures the effect of different returns to these characteristics. The third 
term is the interaction between coefficients and endowment.  
 
Table 4: Blinder-Oaxaca wage decomposition between naturalized and foreign 
employees 
Educational endowment  Coefficients Interaction Wage  differential 
0.0449 0.0491  0.0273  0.1213 
The basic wage equation used for the decomposition contains only education and year dummies. Results are not 
reported here. 
Source: own calculations with data of the IAB employment sample 1975-2001 
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employees is explained by differences in educational endowment (see table 4). This reveals a 
strong positive self-selection among immigrant employees concerning human capital. In 
addition to this, it has to be assumed that the probability for naturalization also varies with 
unobservable characteristics. Immigrants with positive unobservable characteristics like 
motivation or ambition should have a higher preference for naturalization. The following 
empirical analysis therefore has to consider processes of self-selection on observables as well 
as on unobservables. In the next section several econometric specifications will be estimated 
to analyze the relationship between naturalization and wages. 
6 Results 
The following estimations are based on a standard Mincer wage equation derived from human 
capital theory (see Mincer 1974). In this type of regression the most important independent 
variables are education and labor market experience. Furthermore, we control for a number of 
sociodemographic and labor market characteristics. In the first part of the empirical analysis a 
simple pooled OLS regression is carried out to gain first insights about the impact of 
naturalization on wages. All observations are pooled together without taking the panel 
structure of the data into account. Therefore, this basic regression does not allow to control for 
processes of self-selection concerning unobservable characteristics.  
The basic regression is based on the following equation:  
 
(2) ln  wit = α0 + α1 Nit +α2 EDit + α3 EXit + α4 EX
2
it + α5 Yt + β Zit+ εit 
 
where the dependent variable ln wit describes the average daily wage of individual i at time t 
in logarithms. The naturalization of an individual is captured by the term Nit  which  is a 
dummy indicating if an employee is naturalized at time t. It is not only set to unity in the year 
when the naturalization takes place but also in all years after the naturalization act. This term 
captures the advantage of employees who acquired German citizenship. EDit and EXit 
describe the education and labor market experience of individual i over time. The inclusion of 
the term Yt, which is a time dummy, allows to control for cyclical effects on the dependent 
variable. The term Zit  is a vector of control variables containing individual and macro 
  15characteristics like occupation, occupational status, economic sector, region and nation.
23 
Table 5 shows the results for the basic pooled OLS regression. 
Table 5: Pooled OLS 1975-2001 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 













2 0.4441 0.4516 0.4647 0.5324 0.5853 0.6233 
 
Control Variables:  
Human  Capital  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nationality  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region  No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupational Status  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Occupation  No No No No Yes  Yes 
Economic  Sector No No No No No Yes 
Number of observations: 507.325 
Human capital includes education, labor market experience and its square. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
* significant at 1% level 
rounded to 4. decimal place 
Source: own calculations with data of the IAB employment sample 1975-2001 
 
The variable of interest Nit is significant and has the expected sign. Since the basic reference 
category of the naturalization and nationality variable is Third Country National, the results 
can be interpreted as follows: Naturalized employees earn 5.85% higher wages than Third 
Country Nationals.
24 The addition of the other control variables reduces the size of the 
coefficient as expected. In the end remains a significant wage advantage of naturalized 
immigrants over Third Country Nationals of 1.95%. It therefore becomes obvious that the 
huge wage premium of naturalized foreigners can be largely explained by differences in 
observables characteristics like education and occupation. The results of the pooled OLS 
estimation indicate, nevertheless, that naturalization has a positive impact on the wages of 
employees. 
Table 6 shows the results of naturalization for selected national groups including the full set 
of control variables.
25 It becomes obvious that the naturalization effect has the biggest size for 
Third Country Nationals. Employees originating from of a country outside of the EU earn 
3.56% higher wages than non naturalized Third Country Nationals. Furthermore, the 
                                                 
23 Vector Zit contains a term that controls whether an employee is of Turkish origin, belongs to a country of the 
European Union or is a so called Third Country national. 
24 (exp (0.0585)-1)= 0.0602 
25 For the classification of foreign groups within Germany see section 3. 
  16estimates cannot reveal a naturalization premium for Turks. This can be explained by the fact 
that the labor market access for this group is more generous than for Third Country Nationals 
due to a number of bilateral agreements between Germany and Turkey. In addition to this, the 
estimates exhibit that naturalization seems to have a relative strong negative impact effect for 
EU foreigners.
26 This is an interesting result indicating a negative self-selection process 
within the group of EU foreigners. An explanation might be that the naturalizations of EU 
foreigners might be less driven by the aim of improving labor market opportunities, but by 
non-labor market issues.
27 Overall, the results show that especially groups with strong 
constraints on the labor market seem to profit by the naturalization act. Legal status and labor 
market access therefore seem to be the most important channel by which naturalization affects 
the productivity of immigrants. 
Table 6: Pooled OLS by selected groups 






Naturalized  0.0356* (0.0029)  0.0082 (0.0056)  -0.0612* (0.0046) 
R
2 0.5911 0.6727  0.6317 
N 189,262  176,717  140,158 
Control Variables: Human capital, year, region, occupational status, occupation, economic sector 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
* significant at 1% level 
rounded to 4. decimal place 
Source: own calculations with data of the IAB employment sample 1975-2001 
However, the cross-sectional analysis did not allow us to observe how the individual wages 
change over time nor did we control for individual heterogeneity. We performed a Breusch-
Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test and come to the result that the variance of the individual 
error term differs from zero indicating that the estimation should account for unobserved 
heterogeneity of the individuals (see Wooldridge 2002, pp. 264-265). Following Bratsberg et 
al. (2002) a longitudinal analysis based on the following equation is carried out: 
  
(3)   ln wit = α0 + α1 Nit + α2 Nit (EXit- EXiN )+ α3 CAi EXit + α4 EDit  
+ α5 EXit + α6 EX
2
it + α7 Yt + β Zit + μi + εit 
                                                 
26 The EU foreigners include citizens of other associated states like the USA or Switzerland since these countries 
has signed association contracts with Germany simplifying the labor market access. 
27 The free movement of workers and services within the EU enables unrestricted labor market access to EU 
immigrants even without the German passport. In general the same holds true for the access to social services 
like unemployment or child benefits (see Hailbronner 2007, pp.24-28). 
  17with μi describing the individual specific time invariant component of the error term and εit is 
an idiosyncratic disturbance. The term CAi is a time-constant dummy set to unity if the 
employee i naturalizes at a certain point during the observation period. While EXit denotes the 
labor market experience of individual at time t, EXiN describes the experience of individual i 
at the time of the naturalization act. In addition to the former equation, this approach allows to 
differentiate the effect of naturalization by time. The inclusion of the additional terms allows 
to make detailed statements about the question by which channel the naturalization affect 
wages: If α1 is positive, there is an immediate positive wage effect. In the case of a positive α2 
the wage growth after naturalization is accelerated. Both outcomes could be explained by 
increased labor market opportunities as a result of possessing German citizenship. In the case 
of a positive α3 the wages of naturalized employees grow faster even before the naturalization 
act. This can be explained with an increased investment in human capital even prior to 
naturalization (see Bratsberg et al. 2002, p. 573). At first, a random effects estimation was 
conducted. 
Table 7: Random effects 1975-2001 
Dependent variable: ln wi
Naturalized   0.0206* (0.0024) 
Experience since naturalization   0.0034* (0.0004) 
Prior naturalization   0.0007* (0.0001) 
Number of observations  507,325 
Number of Groups  61,312 
R
2 overall 0.5775 
 within   0.6108 
 between  0.5775 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
Regressions also include education, labor market experience and its square, occupation, occupational status, 
region, economic sector, nationality and year. 
* significant at 1% level 
rounded to 4 decimal place 
Source: own calculations with data of the IAB employment sample 1975-2001 
Table 7 shows that naturalization has an immediate positive effect on the wages of employees. 
Naturalization leads to a statistically significant 2.06% boost in wages. In addition to this, the 
estimation indicates that naturalized employees exhibit a rapid wage growth in the years after 
naturalization. Wage growth after naturalization is 0.34 percentage points higher per year. 
Reconsidering the fact that a foreign employee is by average 39 when he acquires the status of 
German citizenship (see table 2) reveals that the effect after the naturalization is rather large. 
Both results are consistent with the argument that naturalization increases the labor market 
  18opportunities of immigrants in various ways. In addition to this, naturalized employees seem 
to exhibit as well a slightly faster wage growth prior to naturalization.  
In the following we assess whether the random effects estimation is the adequate technique. 
This can be done by a Hausman Test, which test for a correlation between the time-constant 
error term and the exogenous variables (see Wooldridge 2002, pp. 251-252). The result of the 
test supports the use of individual fixed effects. For this reason a fixed effects estimation was 
conducted.  
Table 8: Fixed effects 1975-2001 
Dependent variable: ln wi
Naturalized   0.0076* (0.0027) 
Experience since naturalization   0.0029* (0.0004) 
Prior naturalization   -0.0009* (0.0002) 
Number of observations  507,325 
Number of Groups  61,312 
R
2 overall 0.5120 
 within   0.6160 
 between  0.5011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
Regressions also include education, labor market experience and its square, occupation, occupational status, 
region and economic sector. 
* significant at 1% level 
rounded to 4. decimal place 
Source: own calculations with data of the IAB employment sample 1975-2001 
Table 8 shows that all coefficients of interest remain highly significant. While the size of the 
immediate effect is clearly smaller than the one in the random effects estimation the impact of 
citizenship acquisition during the following periods continues to be present. The fact that the 
naturalization premium reduces with the use of fixed effects indicates that that the unobserved 
productivity of employees is positively correlated with the naturalization variable. An 
explanation for this is that immigrants with positive production related characteristics like 
ambition or ability are more likely to naturalize.  
Concerning the prior effect of naturalization, the estimations yield surprisingly a small, 
significant, negative coefficient. This indicates that immigrants who naturalize do not have a 
steeper experience-earnings profile prior to naturalization than immigrants who not naturalize 
at all. In contrary, the results suggest that it is slightly flatter. There are two possible 
explanations for this result: First, the included education variable combines information about 
the highest school and professional graduation of an employee. These can change over time 
and therefore the education variable might capture a notable share of the investment in human 
  19capital prior to citizenship acquisition. In other words: the coefficient might have a different 
sign and size with a time-constant education variable. The second explanation is the 
naturalization pattern of immigrants in Germany. While in countries like Canada most of the 
permanent immigrants have ascended citizenship, Germany is characterized by a huge share 
of long-term immigrants that fulfill the requirements for naturalization, but prefer to stay 
foreigners (DeVoretz and Pivenenko 2005b, p. 437, Constant et al. 2007, p. 2-4).
28 Regardless 
of this, they invest in country-specific human capital due to their permanent location decision. 
For this reason it is a reasonable result that naturalized immigrants do not exhibit a stronger 
wage growth even prior to naturalization. Overall, the panel estimation has shown that despite 
controlling for individual heterogeneity the wage impact of naturalization remains highly 
significant and positive.  
7 Conclusions 
The analysis of the impact of naturalization has shown that citizenship is an economically 
relevant factor in Germany. The descriptive analysis exhibits a sizable wage premium of 
naturalized immigrants, but indicates that educational differences between naturalized and 
non-naturalized immigrants are an important determinant. It has become obvious that 
especially high qualified foreigners tend to naturalize. The estimation of a pooled OLS reveals 
that the wage premium of naturalized foreigners can be partly explained by differences in 
sociodemographic characteristics. However, there remains a significant wage effect of 
naturalization, but the impact varies across immigrant groups. The wage premium has the 
largest size for immigrants from non-associated countries outside the EU. This indicates that 
especially immigrant groups who face strong restrictions to the German labor market profit by 
the naturalization act.  
The longitudinal analysis, which enables us to control for self-selection concerning 
unobservable characteristics within the foreign workforce, confirms that the possession of the 
German passport is an advantage in the German labor market. The analysis shows that 
naturalization has an immediate positive effect on the wages of employees. In addition to this, 
the estimation indicates that naturalized employees exhibit a faster wage growth in the years 
after the naturalization event. 
The findings of the analysis have clear implications for the integration policy in Germany. 
Until now we had no empirical evidence about the role that naturalization plays in the 
                                                 
28 The study of Constant et al. (2007) comes to the result that the length of stay in Germany negatively affects the 
probability of Turkish and ex-Yugoslav immigrants to naturalize or to already have naturalized. 
 
  20economic assimilation process of immigrants. Our results now clearly demonstrate for the 
first time that naturalization has a significant impact on the assimilation in earnings. The 
argument that naturalization designates the end of a successful integration process is herby 
falsified. Undisputed the naturalization act demands already certain integration from the 
immigrant like the acquisition of language skills, but it enables as well to further integration 
by increased labor market opportunities. Therefore the naturalization is neither the beginning 
nor the end of integration, but an important part within the integration process. Policy makers 
can react to these findings by two ways: firstly by allowing unrestricted labor market access 
for all immigrants legally residing in Germany irrespective of their passport. The other well-
known solution would be to increase the naturalization rates which are relative low compared 
to other European countries. This can be done by relaxing the requirements for naturalizations 
or promoting the possibilities and advantages of naturalization within the immigrant 
population. 
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  23Appendix 1: Data set 
Period:  
1975-2001 
Persons  Spells  Years of coverage 
 Frequency  Percent  Frequency Percent Min  Max  Average
Employees 61,312  100 507,325  100  1  27  15.3 
Foreigners 54,612 89.07  426,069  83.98  1  “  15.0 
Naturalized 
immigrants  6,700 10.93  81,256  16.02  2  “  16.8 
Source: own calculations with data of the IAB employment sample 1975-2001 
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